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1.Introduction
More than a century has passed since the widespread adoption of the gold standard in
1879 and almost eighty years stand between its demise at the beginning of the First World
War and the present day. Economists look back to the gold standard period as a time when
international markets in goods and capital operated efficiently and effectively. This view has
served to make the gold standard period a benchmark for studying the experience of the
interwar period or the post-World War II period with respect to issues such as international
integration and international policy coordination.
The gold standard period has also come to serve as a benchmark for exchange-rate
experience since it was largely characterized by stable nominal exchange rates. For example,
the British pound was worth 4.86 United States dollars during the entire thirty-five years of
the gold standard while the pound was devalued twice against the dollar during the shorter
Bretton Woods era. There was also relative stability in the real exchange rate between
the United States and Great Britain during the gold standard period as compared to other
times. The bilateral dollar/pound real exchange rate fluctuated within a range of about
twenty percent during the thirty-five years of the gold standard and its level a few years
after the resumption of the gold standard by the United States was very close to its level
at the outset of World War I. In contrast the Bretton Woods period saw an ongoing loss
of competitiveness of the British pound with respect to the dollar. Britain's bilateral real
exchange rate against the dollar appreciated by more than thirty percent between 1950 and
1973 despite the sixteen percent nominal pound devaluation in 1967.
In this paper we look back to the gold standard period to consider the link between fiscal
variables and the real exchange rate between the United States and Great Britain during
the period from the United States' resumption of the gold standard in 1879 to the outbreak
of the First World War in 1914. Recent empirical studies of the determinants of the real
exchange rate in the post-Bretton Woods era have focused on the role of fiscal variables
under floating nominal parities (Feldstein (1986)) and under the semi.fixed parities of the
European Monetary System (Froot and Rogoff (1991)). As with other topics in international
economics, the gold standard era can serve as a type of benchmark for studying the real
exchange rate since it was marked by relative stability.
A benchmark must not diverge too much from that to which it is compared1 however,
else the comparison is too riddled with differences to make it meaningful. There are manifold
differences in the economic profiles of the United States and Great Britain between the gold
standard period and more recent times and some of these are directly related to a study—2—
of the real exchange rate and fiscal policy. One obvious difference is that governments had
a much smaller role in economies in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as
compared to today. Government expenditures in the United States and Great Britain were
a much smaller proportion of national income during this period than in recent times but
these low levels of expenditures were punctuated by wars in each country, increased public
works spending in the United States in the early 1890s and a naval military buildup in the
United States after the turn of the century. A major source of government revenue in the
United States at that time, tariff revenues, represents an inconsequential part of today's
budget. The modern period has been characterized by persistent inflation and has not had
the steep deflations of the late 19th century. Finally, as mentioned above, there was a stable
nominal parity during the gold standard period while the post-World War II period included
devaluations and a switch from a fixed dollar/pound parity to a floating exchange rate.
While these differences between the classical gold standard period and the present day
hardly need repeating, there are some striking similarities. The extent to which the United
States and Great Britain were open to international trade in goods and assets during the
period from 1879 to 1914 is more similar to the present day than to the intervening half-
century. The steady growth in trade as a proportion of national income for the United
States and Great Britain since World War II has served to return these proportions near
levels that were observed in the late nineteenth century.1 The high degree of international
capital mobility during the gold standard period ended with the First World War and was not
to be seen again until the present day.2 Also, while the period from 1879 to 1914 did not see
a change in the international monetary system similar to the switch from the Bretton Woods
system to a float in 1973, the maintenance of the gold standard was not without dispute.
The United States was riven by the debate over the maintenance of the gold standard in the
1890s and the presidential election of 1896 largely centered on this issue.
The list of similarities and differences between eras discussed above are wide-ranging since
movements in the real exchange rate reflect a range of economic factors. The simple model of
the real exchange rate presented in the next section helps frame the empirical discussion that
follows by showing how different factors affect the real exchange rate. This model captures
both the equilibrium real exchange rate and the dynamics of its adjustment. The third
section provides a historical context for the subsequent empirical analysis by presenting a
chronology of the evolution of the real bilateral dollar/pound exchange rate and the relevant
PaulKrugmari(1990) pages 194-196.
2 See, for example, Maurice Obstfeld(1993).—3—
economic and political events of the time. Section IV presents the empirical results. The
analysis is based upon an econometric model which decomposes the movements in the real
exchange rate into those associated with movements in fiscal variables, as well as those arising
due to productivity shocks and shocks to the assets market. This model provides us with
a variance decomposition of the real exchange rate, an impulse response relationship and a
historical decomposition of its movements. Section V presents the conclusions.
II. A Simple Two-Country Model of the Real Exchange Rate
hithissection we provide a framework for the empirical discussion that follows by sketch-
ing a simple stochastic flexible-price model of the real exchange rate for two countries with
a fixed nominal parity. The model shows how factors such as government expenditures and
supply shocks affect the equilibrium level of the real exchange rate. It also provides insight
into the effect of an expected change in the nominal parity. This is important for our study
since, as we will discuss in Section III below, there were several episodes when there was
some likelihood that the United States would abandon the gold standard. We also discuss
an extension of the model based upon the slow adjustment of relative prices.
The model, which describes the equilibrium conditions in the goods and money markets,
is presented below:
(1)
(2) = — .s)—
whereall variables represent United Kingdom variables relative to United States variables.
All variablesarein logarithms. For example, y =— yis the United Kingdom full-
employment output relative to the United States full-employment output, ag is the nominal
exchange rate between the dollar and the pound (in dollars per pound), gsg+iisthe expected
nominal exchange rate in period i + 1 conditional on information known in period i,fg=
— fis the United Kingdom fiscal shock relative to the United States fiscal shock,
which is interpreted as the United Kingdom government spending relative to the United
States government spending, pg =— r' isthe United Kingdom price index relative to
the United States price index, and mg =— m'is the United Kingdom money supply
relative to United States money supply. Later on, we will also refer to the real exchange
rate, qg, defined as qg =ag+ pg.—4—
Equation (1) is the equilibrium condition in the goods market. Since it is assumedthat
prices and wages are fully flexible, output is always at the full employment level, .The
left hand side of (I) reflects the demand for goods by the government sector1 ft, and the
household sector, c(mt —Pt).We think of government as just purchasing domestic goods,
thus a change in United Kingdom government spending relative to United States government
spending will equally change relative demand for United Kingdom goods.3 We assume that
households, as in the money-in-advance literature, must hold a stock of monetary balances
to purchase goods. We further assume, as is traditional in international economics, that
households need dollars to purchase U.S. goods and pounds to purchase U.K. goods (see, for
example, Helpman (1981)). Thus, households demand for U.K. goods relative to U.S. goods
will be proportional to relative real money balances, nat —
Equation(2) is the condition for portfolio equilibrium. Investors are assumed to have
available a choice between only two assets: U.S. money and U.K. money. Both currencies
bear zero nominal interest.4 To reflect that capital markets in the United States and the
United Kingdom during the period studied were closely integrated, it is assumed that the
holdings of pounds relative to dollars are proportional to the expected rate of depreciation
of the dollar, gsti —St.
In order to examine the path of the real exchange rate over time, we have to postulate
the processes followed by the fiscal shock and the output supply shock. As an example, we
postulate the following relationships:
=y...i+ p
(4) ft=ft_i+,u(
In this section the fiscal shock, f, is assumed to capture just government spending. However, fiscal
policy may affectdemandfor good. indirectly by affecting households' demand for goods. For example1
the domestic currency may appreciate in real term. with the imposition of an import tariff that switches
household, expenditure from foreign to domestic goods. Similarly, domestic fiscal expansions —an increase
in the deficit of the domestic government— may affect households net wealth, and thus modify households
consumption behavior. In turn, this change in demand may affect relative prices of domestic and foreign
goods. For example, Mundell'. (1963) classical result is that expansionary fiscal policy "crowds out" foreign
demand through an appreciation of the real exchange rate. More recently, Giovannini (1988) and Obstfeld
(1969) also find, using an intertemporal optimizing model, that an increase in the government deficit in a
large country will generate a real appreciation of the domestic currency. Thus, in the empirical estimation in
Section IV we extend the model to allow for both tariffs and government deficits effects on the real exchange
rate.
In Section IV we allow for the possibility of bonds denominated in dollars and in pounds.—5—
where the p's are uncorrelated innovations. In equations (3) and (4) we assume that supply
and fiscal shocks are of a permanent nature. This is just a useful simplification reflecting
the highly persistent nature of the shocks.
The government foregoes control over the money supply when it pegs the exchange rate
and faces highly-integrated world capital markets. For example, if the government issues
more domestic money than the private sector is willing to hold, people will trade domestic
money for foreign currency with the central bank. The central bank must accept the domestic
money in exchange for the foreign currency to maintain the peg. The acceptance of this
currency by the central bank, however, nullifies the initial expansionary monetary policy.
Thus the equilibrium relative stock of money is determined by equation (2).
Equation(2) is general enough to allow for different likelihoods of the maintenance of
the fixed exchange rate regime. If the private sector believes that the fixed exchange rate
regime will be maintained then the expected depreciation term (tst+1— Si) willbe zero. The
expected depreciation may not be zero, however, if events suggest to the market that there
is a likelihood of a change in nominal parities. For example, when the government runs a
persistent deficit financed by issuing money there will be a persistent loss of foreign reserves
from the central bank In time, a crisis will develop when people buy up the remaining
reserves of the central bank in anticipation of a devaluation and thereby force the devaluation
to occur.5 In this section we allow expectations of a devaluation to be non-zero although we
do not relate those expectations to a particular process followed by the government deficit.
In particular, we assume that expectations of depreciation are described by:
(5) —at =
wherei4 is an uncorrelated shock. In equation (5) investors expect a permanent devaluation
of the dollar of size p. Naturally, if, for example, expectations of depreciation are generated
by a continuous government deficit, expectations of depreciation will in general be correlated
over time. Thus, equation (5) only provides a useful benchmark to examine the effects of an
expected depreciation on the real exchange rate.
•The equilibrium real exchange rate ia the flexible price model, ,isgiven in (6).
(6)
An increase in the relative level of government spending by the United Kingdom increases
the relative demand for British goods because we assume that governments concentrate
See, for example, Krugman (1979) for a complete model of the timing of a balance of payments crisis.—6—
their spending on goods from their own countries. Therefore the real value of the pound
appreciates with the increased relative demand for British goods generated by the increase in
government purchases by the United Kingdom relative to the United States (i.e., an increase
in fe). Conversely, the pound depreciates with a supply shock that increases the supply of
British goods relative to American goods (i.e., an increase in lit). The third determinant
of the equilibrium real exchange rate is the expected devaluation of the dollar (j4).When
investors expect the dollar to be devalued they sell dollars for pounds, lowering the level of
the money supply in the United States relative to Great Britain (see equation (2)). The lower
relative money supply in the United States lowers the relative demand for American goods
(equation (I)). This results in a reduction of the relative price of United States goods and
therefore a depreciation of the real dollar exchange rate. Thus an expected future nominal
devaluation causes a real depreciation in the present.
For our empirical estimation, we allow also for the possibility of slow adjustment in
prices. We assume the following price setting equation;
(7) m=t—iPt + O(yt—
wherePt is the equilibrium relative price that will prevail in a flexible price model and ytis
the demand.determined level of output in the short run when price adjustment is sluggish.
The pricing rule in this equation encompasses the outcomes of a broad set of models. On
one extreme, it allows for fully flexible prices in a frictionless neoclassical model with output
always at the full.employment level (9 =oo).On the other extreme, prices are set at the
beginning of the period and do not adjust to supply or demand shocks (9 =0),but can he
adjusted after a period.6
The equilibrium real exchange rate with slowly-adjusting prices is given below;
(8) — +
(1+9)
/4) — Ap7+ (it —t—l—
Thereal exchange rate in a slowly-adjusting-price model will increase in response to a fiscal
shock, f, and to an expectation of a future dollar depreciation, /4, but by less than does
the real exchange rate in the flexible price model. Conversely, the dollar will appreciate in
real terms if there is a positive supply shock, j7, but by less than does .
6Wed0 not explicitly model the underlying source of stickiness here, although the rationale for the slow
adjustment of prices in (7) can be provided by the small menu costs of price adjustment a Ia Akerlof and
Yetlen (1985) or Btanchard andKiyotaki(1987).
A—7—
Finally, when prices are not fully flexible, expectations of depreciation of the dollar at
the moment in which prices are set, willalso affect the Teal exchange rate if these
expectations turn out to be wrong ex-post (i.e., if s — — $ 0).The intuition
is straightforward. Prices are assumed to be set at I —1so that they clear the market if
expectations turn out to be correct. When prices are set in period t —1prior to knowing
the nominal exchange exchange rate, i,theywill incorporate price setters' expectation of
the nominal exchange rate. Thus, if individuals expect that a dollar devaluation will occur
next period, prices in the United States will rise accordingly. if in period Ithedevaluation is
not made effective, there will be an appreciation of the dollar real exchange rate and excess
supply of goods in the United States.
III. The Real Exchange Rate and Fiscal Policy During the Gold Standard
As suggested by the model above, movements in the real exchange rate may reflect
changes in a wide range of underlying fundamentals. A study of the bilateral real exchange
rate between the United States and Great Britain during the gold standard period is par-
ticularly interesting since there were many economic and political events at that time which
played a role in the determination of the real exchange rate. To put the econometric anal-
ysis presented below into historical context, we discuss in this section the time path of the
dollar/pound real exchange rate between 1879 and 1914 as well as relevant economic and
political events of the period. We first present the time series of the real exchange rate,
fiscal variables in each country and the relative output, interest rates and money supplies.
This is followed by a narrative of the chronology of the path of the real exchange rate and
concurrent relevant economic and political events.7
Figure 1 presents the logarithm of the real exchange rate between Great Britain and
the United States over the period from 1879 to 1914.8 The range of the real exchange rate's
movement during this period was about twenty percent. The most depreciated value of the
dollar/pound real exchange rate was at the outset of the period and its most appreciated
value was towards the end of the period. As shown in Figure 1, however, the fact that the
extreme values of the real exchange rate were at the beginning and the end of this era does
This narrativedraws from a number ofsources including 3. H. Clapham (1938), Davis R. Dewey (1939),
Barry Eichengreen (1992),MiltonFriedman and AnnaSchwartz (1963), G.P.Jones and A-C. Pool(1940),
W. W. Rostow (1948), and Paul Studenski and Herman E. Kroos (1963).
The real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of British to the American producer price indices (times
the dollar/pound exchange rate) so an increase in this number represents a real depreciation of the dollar.
The sources for these and all other series used in the paper are presented in Data Appendix.—8—
not imply a steady appreciation over the almost four decades coveted by the sample. Instead,
there were periods of sharp appreciation and sharp depreciation that saw near 10 percent
movements in the real exchange rate over the course of a few years.
The time series of some of the factors that may have contributed to the path of the
real exchange rate during this period are presented in Figures 2 and 3. Fiscal variables in
the Great Britain and the United States are presented in the six panels in Figure 2. These
six figures include government purchases relative to GNP, the average tariff rates and the
real government deficits relative to GNP for each country.9 The figures demonstrate the
differences across countries in the range of these variables. Government purchases were on
average much larger in Great Britain than in the United States. Likewise, the Biltish real
budget deficit rose at times to over four percent of national income while in the United States
it never reached two percent.'° Finally, average tariff rates in the United States were orders
of magnitude greater than those in Great Britain.
Figure 3 presents relative monetary bases, relative output, and interest rate differentials
between Great Britain and the United States over the sample period. The figures demon-
strate that the British real output relative to that of the United States fell by about thirty
percent over the sample. Most of this change came in the second half of the sample. The
monetary base of Great Britain relative to the United States likewise decreased over the
sample. This was on the order of sixty percent and it included a substantial change at the
beginning of the sample when gold flowed into the United States after resumption. The
interest rate differential figure demonstrates that the British interest rate was consistently
below that of the United States with the largest differential in the first half of the 1890s
corresponding to the time of the greatest strength of the free silver movement in the United
States.
The data presented here, along with other information on relevant economic and political
events of the times, allows us to develop a chronology of the evolution of the real exchange
rate and its probable proximate causes over our sample. This informal description provides a
Real government deficit is defined as total government deficit minus the inflationary erosion of the
public debt (i.e., government expenditure includes only real interest payments).
Although some of the government imbalances in the United Kingdom were triggered by tai cuts such
as the 1907incometax cut, or by increases in government purchases during the Boa war, some of the deficits
in the 1880s and the beginning or the 1890s were the result of the large seemingly "unanticipated" deflation
from the early 1880s to 1897, which substantially increased the real burden of the debt, in contrast, the
effects of the deflation on the U.S. real government deficit were quite small because of the relatively small
size of the government debt.—9—
historical context for the econometric analysis offered in the next section. The sample begins
with an appreciation of the real value of the dollar of more than fifteen percent within two
years after resumption. This likely reflects the effect of substantial gold inflows at that
time. The United States gold stock rose from $210 million in mid-1879 to $439 million two
years later. The concurrent movement in British gold holdings is reflected in the toss of
forty percent of the Bank of England's reserves during this period. In response, the Batik of
Englandraisedthe bank rate from 2.5 percent in 1879 to 6 percent by 1881. The subsequent
real depreciation of the dollar from 1882-1886 reflects the twenty percent deflation in the
United States and the smaller, twelve percent deflation in Great Britain. During this Linac
there was a financial panic in the United States (in May 1884) and silver purchases weakened
confidence in the maintenance of the gold standard.
The latter half of the 1880s saw a depreciation of the dollar real exchange rate. This may
have been due to a relatively contractionary fiscal policy in the United States since other
factors, like the revival of British lending to the United States, would have put pressure on the
dollar to appreciate. The United States government surplus, equal to $64 million in 18851 rose
over the next few years, reaching a peak of $111 million in 1888 before falling again at the close
of the decade. In the late 1880s, the administration of Grover Cleveland favored reducing this
surplus through tariff reductions rather than through increased spending. This led, however,
to a political backlash and as a consequence the protectionist McKinley Tariff was passed in
1890. One of the most important fiscal implications of the McKinley Tariff was its provision
which put sugar on the "free list." This reduced tariff revenues and shrunk the government'
budget surplus. The surplus was further affected by Congressional authorization of increased
government spending for pensions, rivers and harbors."
The real exchange rate fluctuated within a fairly narrow range of less than five percent
during the 1890s. This quiescence belies the economic and political turbulence of the decade
and reflects forces working in opposite directions on the real exchange rate. The decade
began with a financial crisis when the English banking house of Baring Brothers failed in
1890. The potential panic and economic consequences due to this event, however1 were
averted through timely gold purchases by the Bank of England. A variety of events created
incipient pressure for dollar appreciation in the 1890s. As discussed above, the McKinley
tariff and the Pension Act of 1890 had adverse fiscal implications. The McKinley tariff also
may have contributed to the fall in British exports in the first half of the 1890s when they
were ten percent lower than their average over the previous five years. At the end of the
For a discussion of theevents of thinperiod see Vittorlo Grilli (1990).— 10—
decade the Dingley tariff in 1897 represented the highest tariffs in the United States up until
that point. In Britain the Great Depression continued after a four year hiatus. British prices
fell over the first part of the decade and reached a trough in 1896. Other events during the
1890s tended to cause an incipient dollar depreciation. In May 1893 there was a financial
panic in the United States as gold reserves fell below $100 million, the level thought to be
the minimum required for maintaining the parity. Reserves continued to fall and reached
$66 million at the beginning of 1894 and, despite the efforts of the Morgan syndicate, $50
million by the beginning of 1896. The political events of this time also brought into question
the maintenance of the gold standard by the United States. The free silver forces gained
strength up until the election of 1896. None of these forces seemed to dominate the others,
however, and the real exchange rate ended the century at a level close to that found over
the full decade of the 1890s.
The steep dollar appreciation at the beginning of the new century foretold the higher real
exchange rate volatility in the final years of the sample as compared to most of the earlier
period. The dollar appreciated by about ten percent in the first years of the twentieth
century. This may partially reflect increased confidence in the maintenance of the gold
standard by the United States due to the second failure of the presidential aspirations of
William Jennings Bryan as well as the passing of the Gold Standard Act of 1900 which
made it the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain the gold parity. The period
around the turn of the century also saw an increase in government expenditures associated
with wars by each country. The United States fought the Spanish.American war in 1898
and this raised government expenditures by fifty percent. Great Britain was engaged in the
more protracted Boer War from 1899 to 1902 and this was associated with a spike in British
government expenditures. While an increase in taxes and the limited length of the Spanish.
American War resulted in a small change in the American government's budget deficit, the
British deficit rose dramatically after the turn of the century. This may have contributed to
the depreciation of the dollar after 1902. The dollar appreciated again after 1905. Though
the exact timing of this is difficult to conclusively link to fiscal causes, this period did see an
end to British war spending and an increase in United States government expenditures to
pay for a larger navy and to purchase the Panama Canal. The appreciation after 1905 may
also have been fueled by the marked expansion in foreign investment by British investors
with the United States one of the main recipients of these funds. The severe contraction in
the United States in 1908 in the wake of the 1907 financial panic may also have contributed
to the final stages of the appreciation of the dollar. The sample ends with a real dollar
depreciation from 1909 to 1911 and then a stable real exchange rate in the final two years.— 11—
Thecontraction in the American business cycle from its peak in January 1910 to its trough
in January 1912 occurred at a time when the British economy was in the midst of a five-year
expansion that had begun in 1908.
While fiscal factors, supply and demand shocks, asset market shocks and political factors
could all have played a part in the determination of the real exchange rate during the
gold standard period, a narrative account is insuflicient for decomposing the effects of the
movements in the real exchange rate into parts attributable to each factor. For this reason
we next turn to an econometric model in order to gauge the relative contribution of different
factors to the time path of the real exchange rate under the gold standard.
IV. Empirical Evidence
The model developed above and the narrative provided in Section III suggest the effect
of economic fundamentals such as supply shocks or government expenditures on the real
exchange rate. In this section we empirically explore the links between economic fundamen-
tals and the real exchange rate between Great Britain and the United States for the gold
standard period from 1879 to 1914. We estimate a structural vector autoregression (VAR)
model with variables that represent the differences between British macroeconomic variables
and their American counterparts. We present estimates of the parameters of this structural
VAR and then employ it to consider the variance decomposition of the shocks to the real
exchange rate, the impulse responses of the real exchange rate to a variety of shocks, and a
historical forecast-error decomposition of the real exchange rate.
The model estimated is based upon the model introduced in Section II with minor
modifications. First, we allow three different fiscal shocks to possibly affect the real exchange
rate: (1) government spending, (2) fiscal deficit, and (3) import tariffs. Second, we introduce
bonds denominated in dollars and pounds, which bear positive nominal return. Third, we
incorporate shocks to demand for money into the model to allow for the posihility of financial
innovations, which according to Friedman and Schwartz (1982) were the main factor behind
the increase in the demand for dollars during the gold standard period.'2 Finally, we also
allow for shocks to preferences (which shift demand from U.S. goods in favor of U.K. goods).
12 Friedman and Schwarts (1982) conclude that "the doubling of real balances expressed in weeks of income
in the United States in the course of the three decades from 1876 to 1906, during which Unhed Kingdom
balances fell by 7 percent, suggests that the change in relative 6nancial sophistication of the United Kingdom
and the United States from 1880 to 1906 was probably by all odds the single most important factor accounting
for the divergent trends in real balances." [page 147).— 12—
The modelisnow rewritten as follows:13
(9a) pj =C12y1+ AX1_5 —741
(96) =24tt+ a2591 + U26Tt + a27dt + EA,!X2_+
(9c) =asipf+ C32j—+ gx_5 + r
(9d) => AX_
—
(9e) =A,X_; + ii!
(91) Ti=E A,X5_5+ 'iT
(9g) = —aypg+ a74i1 + a75g + a75r1 + AX2_1 + f
We have already defined most of the variables in SectionH. The new variables introduced in
this section are defined as follows: i =— r' isthe interest rate differential,= 9tsk —
fir' isthe United Kingdom government spending relative to the United States government
spending (as a share of GN?), d =— C' isthe United Kingdom real government deficit
relative to the United States real government deficit (as a share of GNP), and r =r?k—it'is
the United Kingdom average import tariff relative to the United States average import tarifE
In the above equations we define X5 as follows: X1 =(pi,yt, gt, r1, ti,)1. Finally, the js
13 Since during the gold .tandard the nominal exchange rate between the dollar and the pound remained
con.tant, in whatfollow,, andbythe choiceofthenumeraire, Pt willrefer both to the realexchange rate
and to relative pricea indi.tinctly.— 13—
arethe policy or "structural" innovations, which buffet the system and cause fluctuations.
We have already described some of these shocks in Section II. The new shocks introduced
in the above equations are: the shock to preferences or "aggregate demand" shock, 'a',the
shock to money demand, sir,theshock to government expenditure q, the shock to tariff
policy, fl,andthe shock to deficit policy, tfl.
We capture the dynamics in the model introduced in Section II by allowing each variable
in the system to depend on past realizations of all the variables in the system. The .47's
for 3>U capture the propagation mechanism of the economy over time. We impose no re-
strictions on these matrices (except by specifying the maximum lag length). We concentrate
on modelling the contemporaneous relationships based basically on the model described in
Section IL The matrix Ao, whose non-zero elements are denoted by a1 in equations (Ya).
(9g), captures these contemporaneous relations. We now describe more thoroughly these
within-the-period responses. Equation (9a) is the price-setting equation. As in Section Il,
a demand-determined increase in output generates a within-the-year hike in prices. On the
contrary, a supply shock,will push prices downward.14 The aggregate demand equation in
(9b) replicates with minor modifications equation (1). First, the cash-in-advance constraint
is introduced by allowing the nominal interest rate differential to reduce the relative demand
for U.K. goods.'5 Second, the fiscal shock, ,fg,isdecomposed into a government spending
shock, a tariff shock, and a government deficit shock. Equation (9b) postulates that demand
for U.K. goods will increase with increases in U.K. relative government spending, g, with
increases in U.K. tariffs relative to U.S. tariffs, i,andwith increases in U.K. relative real
government deficit, d.'6 Equation (9c) is the typical money demand equation. As postulated
14Theinfluence of the expected flexible price on the mark-up equation, ,,js,is captured by >., A,'X,...
Expectations of devaluation of the dollar create a negative wedge between U.K. interest ratesandU.S.
interest rates. Money demand in the United States decreases, pushing the demand for U.S. goods downward.
16Although,there is basically general agreement that increases in domestic government spending generate
increases in demand for domestic goods since most of government purchases are concentrated on domestic
goods, there is less agreement concerning the effects of tariffs and government deficits. For example, the
effect of tariffs depends1 among other factors, on whether the tariff revenue is redistributed. When the
tariff revenue is not redistributed, the tariff is a combination of an expenditure-switching policy and an
expenditure-reducing policy. While the expenditure-switching element increases demand for domestic goods,
the income effect tends to reduce demand for domestic goods. In this case the effect of the tariff is ambiguous
(See, for example, Ostroy and Rose (1992)). Similarly, the debate over whether government deficit matters is
still unsettled. Some models rule out this connection by assuming an economy inhabitated by an unchanged
cohort of households. In this case, a budget deficit arising from a current tax cut requiring a corresponding
rise in future taxes will not affect present consumption and demand for domestic goods. In contrast some
other models (see, for example, Obitfeld (1989)) allow for changing cohorts of households, with the new
born cohort unconnected with the existing households. A. budget deficit in this ease transfers income from— 14—
inequation (2),expectationsof devaluation of the pound, captured through the interest rate
differential, reduce relative demand for U.K. money. In (9c), we also allow output to affect
money demand. Equation (9d) defines the interest rate differential as a function of the shock
to expectations of devaluation of the dollar. Equations (9e)-(9f) model the behavior of the
fiscal variables as a function of policy shocks fl1, fli- Finally, equation (9g) postulates that
the government deficit decreases with unexpected inflation shocks, which reduce the costs
of borrowing, and with increases in tariff revenues; and it increases with increases in gov.
ernrnent expenditures —purchases and interest payments. Note that in (9g) we allow for the
possibility of a deficit policy shock, 'if.Fiscalpolicy innovations in equations (9e).(9g) _'i',
'it, ,f— aredesigned to capture shocks to policy variables unrelated to other fundamental
macroeconomic influences, such as military spending shocks due to the country engaging in
a war or increases in tariffs due to a protectionist sentiment surge such as the adoption of
the McKinley Tariff Act of i890.'
We can write the model using matrix notation as follows:
(10)
To summarize, the real exchange rate movements in the above model are explained by
a supply and aggregate demand shocks —'ir,'ii'— amoney demand shock and a shock to
expectations of devaluation of the dollar —'ir.'i—p andthree fiscal shocks —'ii,q,'if—.These
"structural" disturbances are uncorrelated over time and have a variance-covariance matrix
= E, which is assumed to be diagonal. The matrix ilo captures the contemporaneous
interaction of the variables. Their dynamic relationship is given by the matrices A5 (for
5 >0).The theoretical source of the dynamic propagation mechanism of the economy is the
slow adjustment in prices discussed in Section II.
Following Bernanke (1986) and Blanchard (1989), we estimate the system in (10) in two
steps: First, we estimate a reduced form relating Xj to its lagged values:
(11) = EB5X1.3+ q
future generations (whose propensity to consume present goods is zero) to the current generation (whose
propensity to consume is positive) creating more demand for present goods. To sum up, tariffs and deficits
do not have clear.cut effects on output and the real exchange rate. Thus, we should turn to the data br
empirical evidence.
ITFiscalpolicy in (9e}.(9g) also reacts to fluctuations in other variables in the economy, such as the level
of economic activity, but only with lags. Although the specification of fiscal policy in equations (9e)-(9g) is
ad hoc, it is nonetheless quite general. For example, the tariff reaction function in (9/) is consistent with a
variety of views on how tariffs are determined, such as countercyclical tariff policy, smoothing government
deficits, or responding to imbalances in the foreign sector.— 15—
whereB1 =(I
—Ao)'A1and Ejisa serially uncorrelated vector of residuals1 which is
observed by the econometrician. Second, we estimate the parameters of A0 using the reduced
vector of residuals and the method of moments. The estimation of A0 will allow us to recover
the "structural shocks," '1k,sincethe following condition holds:
(12) ej =Aoq+ '12
Weestimate the model in equations (11) and (12) with the variables in levels using annual
data for the period 1879-1913. The order of the lag is two, a value based upon the results of
likelihood tests. We first report the estimates of the contemporaneous relationships between
the variables in the system. Afterwards we examine the dynamic transmission of the shocks
throughout the system.
a. The Estimated Contemporaneous Relations
The estimate of thematrix Aa is reported in Table 1. These estimates show how shocks
contemporaneously affect the economy. the estimated price-setting equation is relatively
flat (equation (9a)). This implies little relation between innovations to pjandinnovations
to ygsuggestingthat fluctuations in demand have a small contemporaneous effect on rela-
tive prices and the real exchange rate and a large effect on output. The aggregate demand
function, equation (9b), suggests that aggregate demand within the year strongly increases
with positive shocks to deficit but is little affected by changes in interest rates and tariff
policy. Surprisingly, aggregate demand depends negatively on shocks to government pur-
chases suggesting that government spending during the gold-standard period might not have
been biased towards purchases of domestic goods. The money demand function, equation
[9c), is basically unresponsive to interest rates but increases in proportion to pricrs. The
government deficit equation, [9gJ, shows the deficit increasing with government spending and
decreasing with increases in import tariffs. Unexpectcd shocks to inflation reduce the cost
of borrowing of the government and hence negatively affect the government deficit.
b. Dynamic Effects of Structural Shocks
While we estimate the VAR for the entire set of variables, the focus of our work is the
determinants of the real exchange rate. Therefore we only examine the dynamic effect of
the structural shocks on the real exchange rate. The main source of the fluctuations of the
real exchange rate over time and the dynamic effects of shocks can be examined in a variety
of ways. We first examine the variance decomposition which demonstrates the contribution— 16—
of each source of innovations to the variance of the n-year ahead forecast error for the
real exchange rate. Afterwards, we report impulse responses and a historical forecast-error
decomposition.
b.1 Variance Decomposition
Variance Decompositions are reported in Table 2. Three main findings here are;
1.Innovations to aggregate supply, if, account for most of the variance of the real exchange
rate at short horizons, reflecting that relative prices do not respond immecflately to aggregate
demand shocks.
2. At longer horizons, shocks to expectations of devaluation and deficit innovations account
for a larger fraction of the variance of the real exchange rate. These two innovations jointly
account for 23 percent of the variance at a 4-year horizon and for 37 percent at an 8-year
horizon.
-
3. Theproportion of the variance explained by the supply shock decreases monotonically
over the years suggesting that this shock may be capturing transitory phenomena such as
the effect of bumper crops.
b.2 Impulse Responses
The impulse responses of the real exchange rate to innovations in each of the seven
structural shocks are presented in Figure 4. The results of the variance decomposition above
suggest the importance of the responses to if, ,,andt7f and accordingly we locus on these
results though we also briefly discuss responses to the other innovations.
The panel representing the impulse response of the real exchange rate to a positive
supply shock (a positive supply shock in the United Kingdom relative to a supply shock in
the United States) in Figure 4 demonstrates an appreciation in the real dollar exchange rate
for about three years. Thereafter, its effect on the real exchange rate is basically zero. Since
supply shocks have mainly transitory effects on output too (not reported), these shocks
may capture the large transitory fluctuations in agricultural output that occurred in this
period, such as the unusually large crops in the United States in 1880-1881 and 1891-1892.
In these years, American production was the largest on record and so were exports of crude
foodstuffs. This generated a large gold inflow which, in turn, caused over time a spurt in the
U.S. money stock and a subsequent rise in U.S. wholesale prices, reverting the initial dollar
real depreciation due to the positive supply shock.— 17—
itis interesting to examine in detail the response of the real exchange rate to a decrease
in the interest rate differential. As postulated in Section II, the expectation of a dollar-
depreciation, which is manifested in an increase in the U.S. interest rates relative to those
in the U.K. (i.e., a negative shock to the interest differential) leads to an depreciation in
real terms of the dollar. The estimate suggests that an eighty basis points negative shock
to interest rate differential has basically no effect on the real exchange rate on impact but
leads to a 1 percent depreciation of the real exchange rate for the dollar in the medium
run. Since interest rate differentials were larger in absolute values in the disturbed decade
of the 1890s, thu impulse response reflects in large part the response of the real exchange
rate to the agitation over silver. As it is discussed in Section III, during the 1890s there was
a general distrust of the maintenance of the gold standard originating with the passing of
the Sherman Silver Purchase Act in mid-1890. This distrust was manifested in a on-average
large outflow of gold in 1892. The Senate's approval in July 1892 of a free silver coinage
bill, which never became a law, reinforced such fears. Moreover, the run on the banks in
the financial crisis of 1893 reinforced those fears further increasing capital outflows. These
capital outflows reduced the money supply and prices and led to a dollar depreciation.
The estimated dynamic effect of a shock to deficit policy is consistent with the traditional
Mundell.Fleming model over the medium and long run. An increase in Great Britain's deficit
relative to the one in the United States leads to an appreciation in real terms of the pound.
A one-standard deviation innovation in the deficit, which increases the relative deficit by 0.1
percent permanently, appreciates the pound by up to 0.5 percent in the medium and long
run. Surprisingly, we find that in the short run an increase in the deficit in Great Britain
has a deflationary impact and thus depreciates the pound by about 1 percent.
Finally, we discuss very briefly the four other impulse responses. Positive money demand
innovations —in Great Britain relative to the United States—, which stand for such factors
as financial innovations, generate an appreciation of the pound in the short andmedium
run, which is what the conventional wisdom would lead one to expect.In the long run
the effect is basically zero. Similarly, a one.standard positive aggregate demand shock in
Great Britain relative to the United States leads to a 0.4 percent real appreciation of the
pound. An increase in relative tariffs generates a positive shock to demand for goodsin
Great Britain leading to price increases in this country relatively to the United States. A
positive one-standard deviation shock to tariffs, which increases tariffs on impact inabout
1.5 percent leads to a depreciation of the dollar in real terms in at most 0.3 percent after
five years. Surprisingly, a positive shock to government purchases in Great Britain relatively
to the United States generates an appreciation of the dollar. While the impact responseof— 18—
thereal exchange rate is difficult to reconcile with any model, the medium and long run
depredation of the pound may capture the movements in relative prices needed to offset the
U.K. current account deficit brought about by the increase in U.K. government spending
relative to U.S. government spending (see, for example, Giova.nnini (1988)).
b.3HistoricalDecomposition
The seven panels in Figure 5 illustrate the roles played by the different shocks over
different historical episodes. Each panel plots the forecast error of the real exchange rate
at the four-year horizon and the portion of this forecast error attributable to each of the
respective structural shocks. A closer tracking of the particular "structural" innovation
(represented by the dashed line) to the overall real exchange rate innovation (represented by
the solid line) suggests a larger role for that innovation as a source of the innovation of the
real exchange rate.
Of the three fiscal shocks, the government deficit shock seems to track the real exchange
rate innovation the most closely. At the end of the 1880s there were government surpluses
in the United States. At this time, the total forecast error of the real exchange rate showing
the unexpected real dollar depreciation is closely tracked by the error attributable to the
relative fiscal constraint in the United States. These United States fiscal surpluses were
feared to be contractionary. Policy reversed this fiscal stance by 1894 with the revenue
effects of the McKinley tariff (which put sugar on the free list) as well as increased spending
on pensions, rivers, and harbors. Our decomposition picks up the unexpected appreciation of
the dollar at this time. After 1895 the deficits of the United States and the United Kingdom
began to diverge to a greater extent than in the earlier part of our sample. The deficit in
the United States changed relatively little from 1895 to World War I but the deficit in the
United Kingdom shifted dramatically, first falling with the end of the Boer War (1899-1902)
and then rising with the income tax cut in 1907. Our decomposition shows that the effects
of the relative deficit tracks the real exchange rate after 1905. The pound first depreciates
after 1905 with the fiscal contraction in the United Kingdom and then appreciates in the
subsequent fiscal reversal after 1907.
The contribution of the innovations of the other two fiscal factors to the total innovation
of the real exchange rate appear relatively slight. Innovations to government purchases are
only mildly associated with the overall innovation to the real exchange rate. The tariff shock
makes the smallest contribution to the total real exchange rate innovation of any of the
seven innovations. Neither of the two changes in tariffs in the period studied, the McKinley— 19—
Tariff Act of 1890 nor the Dingley Tariff of 1897, show up in the estimates as important
explanations of the real exchange rate innovation in those years.
The innovation that accounts for the preponderance of the innovation in the real exchange
rate is the output supply shock. This shock seems to explain relatively well the fluctuations
in the real exchange rate around the turn of the century. One possible explanation can be
traced to the favorable agricultural shock in the United States and unfavorable agricultural
shock in Europe in 1897 and 1898. While initially these shocks exerted downward pressure
on U.S. commodity prices relative to U.K. prices (a depreciation of the dollar in real terms),
over time this trend was reversed. The reversion of the trend was brought about by the
subsequent major shift in the recorded balance of merchandise trade in the United States,
which was promptly reflected in gold movements —about 200 miilion during the 1897-1899
period. After some delay, in the 1899-1903 period, this shock was reflected in prices, which
started to increase relative to those in England leading to a real dollar appreciation. After
1903 the real appreciation of the dollar was reversed with the dollar depreciating about 8
percent in real terms in the 1903-1906 period. Interestingly, these years were characterized
by strong industrial growth in the United States, of which the most obvious signs were the
rapid growth of the output of coal and iron and of the volume of railroad traffic.
The expectations of devaluation and money demand shocks seem to track the innovations
to the real exchange rate over selected periods. The innovation due to the credibility shock
—expectations of devaluation of the dollar— closely tracks the innovation in the real exchange
rate from 1892 to 1898. This corresponds to the period of the rise and subsequent fall in the
political strength of the free silver movement. During the time when the free silver movement
was strongest the likelihood of the United States abandoning the gold standard was greatest.
The innovation due to money demand tracks the overall real exchange rate innovation most
closely at the beginning of the sample. At this time, in the wake of resumption, there was
an increased in demand for money in the United States. Thus at this time we see a decrease
in the money demand shock and a corresponding appreciation of the dollar.
V. Conclusion
There are three possible channels through which fiscal policy could have affected the
bilateral dollar/pound real exchange rate during the gold standard. The first is through the
standard effect of government expenditures shifting the consumption pattern of the economy
and affecting the relative price of domestic versus foreign goods. The second effect of fiscal
policy is through tariffs which were an important source of revenues for, the United States— 20—
duringthis period. Changes in government deficit are the third source of fiscal effects on
the real exchange rate. Government deficits, as it was discussed in Section IV, may alter
the behavior of households and therefore the equilibrium relative price of domestic goods.
Although not modelled explicitly, persistent U.S. government deficits may have affected the
public's faith in the maintenance of the gold standard by the United States. We find that
there is almost no empirical evidence that tariffs and government spending affected the real
exchange rate. There is some stronger evidence that innovations in government budget
deficits were associated with innovations to the real exchange rate. This is specially true
with the large increases in deficits in the United Kingdom with the Boer war and the income
tax cut in 1907.— 21—
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DataAppendix
I. Definitions
Government Purchases =G.Expenditure—C.InterestPayments —G.TransferPayments





=Deficit4+Debt — .zL1 100
GNPGNP
=CountryjProducerPrice Index iii period (in logs)
=dollar/poundnominal exchange rate in period t (in logs)
=CountryjMonetaryBase in period t (in logs)
=CountryjrealGNP in period t (in logs)
=Countryjshortterm nominal interest rate in period
II. Sources
Nominal Exchange Rate
1879-1884: Edwin Perkins (1978).
1885-1889: Commercial and Financial Chronicle, various issues.
1890-1910: National Monetary Commission (1910).
1911-1913: F.A. Pearson and G.F. Warren (1935), Table 6, page 158.
Producer Price Index
a. United States
1879-1913: F.A. Pearson and CF. Warren (1935), Table I, pages 6-10.
b. United Kingdom
1879-1884: BR. Mitchell (1988), Table Prices 4, page 725.
1885-1913: Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, various issues.— 25—






1879-1913: Calculated as theratioof Nominal GNP to the GNP Deflator.
Nominal GNP
a. United States
1879-1888: Estimated as realGNPx GNP Deflator.
1889.1908: Historical Stati.slics of the United States (1975), Series Fl.
1909.1913: The National Income and Product Account., of the United States (1981).
b. United Kingdom
1879-1913: Capie and Webber (1985), Table 111.12.
GNP Deflator
States




1890-1909: National Monetary Commission (1910), Table 29. 4/6-month rates.
States
Christina Romer (1986).
Historical Statistics of the United States (1975), Series F3.







Capie and Webber (1985), Table 111.12.
States
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Table B-3.
Kingdom







1879-1913; Capie and Webber (1985). Table 111.10, column V. 3-month bank bills.
Government Expenditure
a. United States
1879-1913: Historical Statistics of the United States (1975). chart Y457-469.
b. United Kingdom
1879-1913:Mitchell andDeane (1962), pages 397-399.
Government Interest Payments
a. United States
1879-1913: Mitchell and Deane (1962), pages 397-399.
b.UnitedKingdom
1879-1913: Mitchell and Deane (1962), pages 397-399.
Government Transfer Payments
a. United States
1879-1913:Historical Statistics of the United States (1975), Charts Y457-465, Y466-471.
b.UnitedKingdom
1879-1913: Mitchell and Deane (1962) Social Security Payments, page 400.
Government Revenue
a. United States
1879-1913: historical Statistics of the United States 1975, Chart Y258-263.
b. United Kirigdoni
1879.1913: Mitchell and Deane (1962), T3, Public Finance. Page 393-
Government Debt
a- United States
1879.1913: Historical Statistics of the United States (1975),ChartY368-Y369.— 27—
b.United Kingdom
1879.1913: Mitchell and Deane (1962), T5, page 403.
Customs Duties
a. United States
1879-1913: Historical Statistics of the United States (1975).
b.UnitedKingdom
1879-1913:Mitchell and Deane (1962), pages 393-395.
Imports
a. United States
1879-1913:Historical Statistics of the United States (1975), Dutiable Imports.
b. United Kingdom
1879-1913: Mitchell and Deane (1962), pages 283-284.Table I
EstimatedContemporaneous Effects















































91.85 6.04 0.00 0.19 0.93 0.05 0.94
60.96 5.49 12.99 5.04 3.81 0.10 11.61
52.83 4.61 14.42 8.32 5.43 0.09 14.31
47.14 5.86 13.34 15.03 5.27 0.48 12.87
42.34 6.75 13.39 19.23 4.78 1.10 12.39







58,89 7.69 12.53 21.65 4.51 1.15 13.59
3775 7.78 12.52 22.45 4.30 1.22 13.98
Th7 I 5.01 12.58 23.38 4.19 1.25 13.88
35.79 8.53 12.46 24.18 4.14 1.22 13.68
35.01 9.09 12.19 24.70 4.09 1.35 13.56
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